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Abstract 
 
According the linguistic relativity hypothesis, the language one speaks affects how one 
thinks. Because languages differ in how they categorize color, linguistic relativity has often been 
tested by conducting experiments on color perception and memory. This study examines the 
linguistic relativity hypothesis using ecologically valid stimuli: pictures of eyes. Because Russian-
speakers are more likely to describe blue/grey eyes as grey, whereas English speakers are more 
likely to describe them as blue, English and Russian participants were asked to match the 
overall color of blue eyes to a color scale. There were three conditions. In the first condition 
(perception), participants saw the color scale and an eye picture simultaneously and then chose 
the color that best matched the picture. In the second condition (memory), participants 
matched the color of an eye to the color scale from memory. The third condition (label) was 
similar to the second, except participants labeled the eye orally before matching the color from 
memory. A 3 (condition) x 2 (language) ANCOVA and Bayesian analysis were used to analyze the 
data. Overall, the ANCOVA and Bayesian analysis indicated that there was a main effect of 
language. Russian-speaking participants were more likely to rate the eyes as greyer than 
English-speaking participants. The Bayesian analysis also suggested that there may also have 
been an interaction, with Russian and English-speaking participants rating the eyes similarly in 
the perception condition, but not the memory or labeling conditions. Overall, the findings 
provide novel evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis 
I have tested the linguistic relativity hypothesis by examining how native Russian and 
English speakers perceive and remember eye color. The linguistic relativity hypothesis is an idea 
that evolved over time based largely on the work of Benjamin Whorf in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Whorf was never formally trained in linguistics. He studied chemical 
engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and worked at the Harford Fire 
Insurance Company after his graduation until his death. Despite not having an education in 
linguistics, he became interested in how language may influence thought in his late twenties. As 
a result, he developed ties with several prominent linguists of his time including Edward Sapir. 
These ties helped him study Native American languages (Whorf & Carroll, 1998). 
Whorf’s ideas have been condensed into the linguistic relativity hypothesis. The 
hypothesis posits that the language one speaks influences the way one thinks. According to 
Whorf, grammar, word frequency and linguistic categories all shape thought. He said, “We 
dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages…. The world is presented in a 
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds—and this means 
largely by the linguistic systems in our minds” (Whorf & Carroll, 1998, p. 213). For example, 
Whorf argued that in the Hopi language, verbs treat time differently than they do in English. 
According to Whorf’s research, brief events that are described in English as nouns (e.g., 
lightning, wave, flame, meteor) are always verbs in Hopi. This is due to the fact that Hopi 
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grammar is more likely to classify nouns and verbs in terms of duration than is English (Whorf 
& Carroll, 1998, p.215). Whorf argued that variations in categorization such as the one just 
described train speakers to attend to different phenomena and thus think about such events 
differently.  
Another famous example that is commonly used to explain the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis is the fact that certain Eskimo languages have several words for snow. The 
phenomenon was first described by Franz Boaz, a German-American anthropologist (Boaz, 
1911, pp. 145-146). Whorf claimed that if Eskimos have more than one word for snow, then they 
think about snow differently. There has been a lot of debate about whether differences between 
languages really do shape thought and perception. 
Among those most critical of the linguistic relativity hypothesis are cognitive 
psychologists. In my opinion, there are two main reasons why this is the case. First, linguistic 
relativity gained in popularity during a time when there were few if any empirical studies that 
examined it. When the cognitive revolution took place, many cognitive psychologists naturally 
questioned claims about thought that lacked data to back them up. Secondly, cognitive science 
deals with finding universal patterns in memory, perception and thought in general. Linguistic 
relativity states that cognition may vary based on the language one speaks. Researchers who are 
trying to find universal rules may feel challenged by such an idea.  
Those who favor a universalist explanation of how thought and language are linked argue 
that thinking is more or less independent of language. For example, Noam Chomsky 
distinguished between the deep structure and surface structure of grammar. Deep structure refers 
to the components of grammar that give an utterance its underlying meaning. Surface structure 
refers to the outward manifestation (which is similar to the phonetic expression) of the utterance 
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(Chomsky, 1965, p. 17). Chomsky argued that although surface structure may vary across 
languages, deep structure does not (Chomsky, 1965, p. 118). In other words, languages are very 
similar in terms of the types of rules that govern them, but they are different in how they are 
conveyed verbally. To Chomsky, any differences observed between two languages are just 
different ways of saying the same thing. If this is true, there would be minimal (if any) influence 
of one’s language on cognition.  
I aimed to examine how language influences perception and memory in my thesis by 
examining the differences in how English and Russian-speakers describe eye color. Russian-
speakers are more likely to describe an eye as grey whereas English-speakers are more likely to 
describe it as blue. If the linguistic relativity hypothesis is valid, then one would expect the way 
the two cultures describe eyes will influence the way they perceive and remember them. It 
should be noted that, although this study deals with color perception, Whorf never actually talked 
much about color. He was more interested in grammar, how people make categorizations based 
on their native language and how those categorizations influence thought.  
Nevertheless, there has been a substantial amount of research done on color in an attempt 
either to support or refute Whorf’s views. Both opponents and advocates of linguistic relativity 
point to different studies that examine color in order to provide evidence for or argue against the 
hypothesis. The experiments that have been done are useful in understanding color perception. 
However, most were done by using simple Munsell chips or stimuli that are uniform in color 
rather than real world objects. My study was an attempt to use stimuli one would find in the real 
world to test Whorf’s ideas. 
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Early Cross Cultural Color Studies Favoring Universalism 
In order to study how language influences thought, many researchers have studied color. 
Color is a common way to study the linguistic relativity hypothesis because the stimuli can be 
controlled. In other words, a color can be described objectively in terms of wavelength, 
saturation, brightness, etc. Different languages divide color into different categories. At first 
glance these categories seem to be culturally specific and non-universal. English has the word 
blue, whereas Russian divides blue up into two terms: goluboy (light blue) and siniy (dark blue). 
The fact that color categories are partitioned differently across languages supported the idea of 
the linguistic relativity hypothesis in the early twentieth century. 
Berlin and Kay (1969) were among the first to question whether languages/cultures 
divide color into arbitrary categories. They systematically studied color terms across 20 different 
languages. Participants were asked to indicate the total number of ‘basic color terms’ their native 
language had and where the boundaries were for each basic color term. Basic color terms had to 
meet certain criteria: they had be mono-lexemic (e.g., lemon-colored would not be acceptable), 
they could not be represented by any other color term (e.g. crimson is a type of red, and therefore 
not a basic color term), they could not be restricted to only a narrow class of objects (e.g., blond 
is unacceptable) and they had to be psychologically salient, meaning native speakers had to 
know what the color terms were and agree that they were indeed major color categories.  
Once participants named their language’s basic color terms, they were given a board with 
329 standardized color chips that were arranged by hue and brightness. Participants were asked 
to indicate every chip that represented each color term as well as the best example of each. The 
data indicated that languages categorize colors systematically.  
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Despite the fact that one language may have a different number of basic color terms, a 
distinct pattern emerged. Each language had at least two color terms. If a language only had two, 
then the terms represented black and white. All languages with only three basic color terms had 
color categories for black, white, and red. If a language had four color terms, then they divided 
the color chips into black, white, red and either yellow or green. Languages with five color terms 
categorized colors into black, white, red, yellow and green. If a language had six, then they had 
the same categories as languages with five categories but added a blue term. If a language had 
seven or more color terms, it had some combination of purple, pink, orange and grey. Berlin and 
Kay’s work was influential and helped turn the tide against linguistic relativism to universalism.  
A couple of years later, Heider (1972) found that Berlin and Kay’s “basic colors” are 
more easily encoded and better remembered across different languages than are “inter-nominal” 
or “boundary” colors. Inter-nominal colors are colors that do not fall into any of the basic color 
ranges. However, inter-nominal colors were similar in hue, value or saturation to basic color 
terms. Boundary colors were those that were adjacent to basic colors. In a series of experiments, 
Heider tested several dependent variables including the number of letters colors have, reaction 
time for naming colors, and memory for colors. In each experiment a general trend emerged: 
regardless of language, basic colors had fewer letters, were named more quickly and were 
remembered better than inter-nominal and boundary colors.  
Other factors also contributed to universalism gaining popularity. Heider (1971) found 
that children chose basic colors more frequently when allowed to choose any color, matched 
basic colors better than non-basic ones, and chose basic colors to represent color terms. 
Bornstein, Kessen, and Weiskopf (1976) discovered that infants who are habituated to a certain 
hue will look at a different hue longer if it comes from a different adult color category than if it 
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comes from the same category even if the new colors are equally distant in terms of wavelength 
from the original hue. That is, they categorized colors as adults do. For example, the researchers 
found that infants who are habituated to a blue hue of 480 nanometers look longer at a green hue 
of 510 nm than a darker blue hue of 450 nm. On the basis of such research, linguistic relativity 
looked like a flawed hypothesis, at least in terms of color perception. It was replaced with a 
universal, neurophysiological explanation that was popular in cognitive science. A quote from 
Pinker (1995, p. 136) sums up the “consensus” that was formed: 
[The linguistic relativity hypothesis] asserts that the categories and relations that we use 
to understand the world come from our particular language, so that speakers of different 
languages quite literally conceptualize the world in different ways….This is an intriguing 
hypothesis, but virtually all modern cognitive scientists believe it is false. 
However, understanding the neurophysiological basis of color perception not only helps one 
understand how universal color terms develop, but may also help support the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis.  
The Neurophysiological Basis of Color Perception 
There are three points to be made in this section. The first is to explain the biological 
argument behind the universalist explanation of color perception. The second, which may seem 
contradictory to the first, is to demonstrate that neurophysiology does not preclude Whorfian 
effects on color perception and memory. The third is to demonstrate that even if the differences 
in perceiving color are small across cultures, those differences would be significant given the 
strong, universal, biological component of color perception.  
Biologically speaking, it is difficult to explain how people experience color. Light enters 
the eye, is absorbed by light-sensitive cells, gets converted into electrochemical signals and is 
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sent to the brain where it is interpreted. However, there is still a ‘black box in our brain’ into 
which the signals enter and out of which vision is produced (Kuehni, 2012, p. 23). Despite this, 
much is known about the cells and parts of the brain that are involved. 
Humans can see wavelengths of light that range roughly from 400 nm to 700 nm. Once 
light hits the retina, it passes through several layers of cells, including ganglion cells, amacrine 
cells, bipolar cells, rods, and cones (Kuehni, 2012). I only discuss cones in detail here because it 
is most responsible for color vision. There are three types of cones, and each type has a different 
absorption spectrum (Cornsweet, 2012). In other words, each type has different wavelengths of 
light to which they are most sensitive. There is debate as to what to call the types, but for this 
thesis they are named L, M, or S in reference to their sensitivities. If one were to label colors 
according to wavelength, red would correspond to long wavelengths, green would correspond to 
medium wavelengths and blue would correspond to short wavelengths. However, different types 
of cones can be activated at the same time. For example, light that creates a response in an L 
cone may also create a response in a nearby M cone. (Stone, 2012). 
It should be noted at this point that this explanation of color perception is an 
oversimplification of what actually happens. Information from all three cones is used in order to 
process color. However, it is more complicated than just mixing input from the L, M and S cones. 
There appears to be an ‘opponent system.’ Color opponency refers to the fact that output data 
from different types of cones are subtracted from each other. There are two ways this happens: 
L-M and L+M-S (Kuehni, 2012). These form two color dimensions or channels. The L-M 
subtraction creates a color channel of red and green whereas the L+M-S subtraction creates a 
color channel of yellow and blue (see Figure 1). In other words, output from specific types of 
cones is compared to the output from others. In the L+M-S dimension, the L and M cones are 
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compared to S cones. If light hitting the retina is above 500 nm, the yellow side of the dimension 
dominates and the blue side is inhibited. In the L+M dimension, green dominates from about 475 
nm to 575 nm, while red dominates above and below those values (Kuehni, 2012). The brain 
then takes the information from the two channels and perceives other colors. See Figure 1 for a 
representation of the two color channels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A representation of the color component channels.  
A couple of points should be made. First, because of the opponent system, some pairs of 
colors can never be perceived as being mixed. When the L and M cones activate yellow, blue is 
inhibited. Thus, there is no “yellowish-blue” color term or vice versa. The same is true of red and 
green. Second, there are four unique hues that correspond to the excitation of only one half of 
one color channel. For example, if there is only L cone stimulation, then a unique hue of red is 
perceived that one would say is not a mix of any other colors (i.e., it is not perceived as being 
reddish-orange, purplish-red, etc.). There are also unique hues for yellow, green and blue where 
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unique yellow is produced by L and M cones being activated with no S cone input, unique green 
is created by having only M cone stimulation and unique blue corresponds to only S cone 
stimulation. These hues correspond to the colors that make up the two channels (Kuehni, 2012). 
As one may have noticed, these are the main four colors (other than black and white) that Berlin 
and Kay (1969) found in most languages. Biology certainly plays a role in how colors are 
categorized across peoples.  
Taken together, it is clear that there is a strong universal neuropsychological component 
to color perception. The first colors (after black and white) that are common to most cultures are 
red, yellow, green and blue, which match the colors in the two color channels. Additionally, 
there are no words for the physiologically impossible hues of yellow-blue or red-green. If 
languages arbitrarily create color categories, one would expect to find at least some languages 
with such color terms. The fact that they do not exist is evidence that color perception is limited 
by biology. However, there is another piece of the puzzle that has not yet been discussed in this 
section of the proposal: the brain itself. 
The previous description of cone type and color perception seems straightforward. In 
reality, there are multiple steps in processing the information in the brain that lead to color 
opponency. There is a lot of uncertainty as to the specifics, but in general ganglion cells in the 
retina play an important role in creating initial color opponency. Information is then sent to the 
lateral geniculate nucleus, the primary visual cortex (V1), the prestriate cortex (V2) and on to 
higher visual areas (e.g., extrastriate visual cortex, Visual Area V4), which are responsible for 
perceiving color, orientation and movement (Spillmann, 1990, pp. 179-185). It should be noted 
that by the time color information reaches the primary visual cortex, initial color opponent 
information has been modified, and by the time it reaches V4, color information is averaged 
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across cells and combined with brightness information that has been processed separately 
(Kuehni, 2012). Complicating matters further is the fact that the brain combines visual 
information with previous knowledge about the world. Previous knowledge that is used includes 
information from memory and expectations about what one expects to see. 
A logical conclusion is that eyes do not see. The brain does. Color is not perceived based 
on wavelength alone. For example, the same color may look different depending on the color of 
its background. For an example of this, see Figure 2 where the red boxes are the same 
wavelength of light, but the ones on the right look lighter than the ones on the left. This happens 
because the brain uses the surrounding context in its interpretation of color. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Color illusion where red squares look like different colors. 
 Color constancy is another phenomenon that demonstrates that the brain does not rely 
only on the wavelength of light to perceive color. Color constancy refers to the fact that the color 
of an object is perceived the same even if the illuminant changes (Ebner, 2007). For example, an 
apple looks red in bright sunlight and under a fluorescent light. Stone (2012, p. 156) pointed out 
that what we see follows a simple formula: a perceived image = image data + prior expectations. 
If this is true, then one could speculate as to how the language one speaks affects and/or reflects 
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one’s prior expectations. If one’s culture describes the color of an object differently than does 
another culture, would that affect the perception of that object? What about how one remembers 
it? These are questions that are directly related to the linguistic relativity hypothesis and this 
thesis. 
Problems with the Universalist Approach and Evidence in Favor of the Linguistic 
Relativity Hypothesis Regarding Color 
 
It is clear that the brain interprets input from the retina and combines it with prior 
expectations. It is unclear whether linguistic information is part of those prior expectations. 
However, an important point must be made first: the way Whorf’s hypotheses were framed by 
cognitive scientists in the mid and late twentieth century was different than what Whorf actually 
proposed. Before one can examine evidence about the linguistic relativity hypothesis, one has to 
frame it correctly. 
When researchers started criticizing what they called “linguistic relativity” or the “Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis” they made three arguments: linguistic relativity implies that language is 
deterministic, it is hermetic, and there can be infinite variability between languages (Leavitt, 
2010, pp. 167-168). Determinism refers to the idea that language (and only language) determines 
how one thinks and perceives. Hermeticism states that it is impossible to translate from one 
language to another because each language has its own unique way of conveying ideas. Infinite 
variability is the idea that languages are different from each other in every aspect imaginable 
(e.g., how they categorize color, phonemes, grammar). In fact, Whorf never made any of these 
arguments. They were extreme positions used in order to strengthen universalism’s claims. 
Proverbial straw men were set up that could easily be knocked down by any one of three possible 
findings: language is not a prerequisite of thought, one can translate a language into another 
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language, or language universals exist. For example, Michaels (1977) oversimplifies Whorf’s 
ideas by stating the following:  
Whorf’s claims that individual languages structure reality differently seem to fail on his 
own evidence. The fact that languages are inter-translatable… suggests that linguistic 
relativity reduces simply to the claim that to speak grammatically in any given language 
one must use the grammar of that language (p. 333). 
The fact of the matter is that such criticism is an oversimplification and misrepresentation of 
Whorf’s position. Whorf believed in the universality of cognitive abilities and that one can say 
anything one wants to in any language. If people can say whatever they want to in their native 
language, then translations are no longer impossible. In reality, the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis can be summed up by what Whorf really thought. He believed that different 
languages predispose speakers to attend to certain domains over others based on how they 
normally convey information, and that is the basis for how language affects thought (Leavitt, 
2010). For example, in English there are different ways to describe water. One can talk about 
water as rain, dew, snow, ice, mist, steam, hail, frost, and so forth. Each term takes on a specific 
meaning, and the way each is used contextually trains native English speakers to notice specific 
properties of water that they otherwise may not have detected. 
It should also be briefly noted that many researchers did not sufficiently consider 
evidence that supported the linguistic relativity hypothesis, and their methods may have been 
culturally biased. In Berlin and Kay’s study (1969) on basic color terms, there was substantial 
variation in the number of color terms across cultures, and that variation was not studied in 
depth. When Heider (1972) published a series of experiments that found basic colors were more 
easily encoded and remembered across cultures, she found that Dani speakers were significantly 
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worse at remembering colors than English speakers. The memory task consisted of seeing a 
uniform colored chip, waiting five seconds and then picking out the color just seen in a 160-chip 
array. The fact that they did significantly worse than English speakers is worth mentioning 
because the Dani language only has two color terms. In fact, the discrepancy between the two 
groups had the largest effect size in the study. One interpretation of these results could be that 
having words for the so-called basic color terms aids in perceiving and remembering those 
colors. This explanation was not taken seriously by many researchers at the time because Dani 
speakers still remembered basic colors better than other hues (such as inter-nominal colors). 
The studies also relied on characterizing color by hue and brightness. This may have 
biased the results. For example, Conklin (1955) found that Hanunoo, a language spoken in the 
Philippines, describes color based on hue, brightness as well as “wetness.” Based on Berlin and 
Kay’s criteria, Hanunoo has four basic color terms: black, white, red and light green. However, 
since colors also seem to be paired with information about their “wetness,” researchers may be 
prone to overlook how those categories are applied in practice. For example, in Hanunoo a shiny, 
wet brown colored section of bamboo is labeled as green because it is wet. Theoretically, it 
should be described as red because brown is closer in hue to red than green. The important point 
here is that if one wants to examine the linguistic relativity hypothesis and color perception 
critically, one must look at how language variation affects cognition, and not just how 
physiology (e.g., cones in the retina) affects language. 
As mentioned previously, the main argument behind linguistic relativity is that one’s 
language helps determine what people attend to. If different languages do in fact make speakers 
pay attention to certain domains more than others, then there are a number of ways to test this 
proposition. Many researchers have turned to how language affects color coding and reaction 
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time. Kay and Kempton (1984) were among the first to examine coding, and they were able to 
find so-called “Whorfian effects.” They conducted a cross-cultural study between English and 
Tarahumara speakers. Unlike English, Tarahumara only has one word for what English speakers 
would consider green and blue. Participants were given three colors and asked to pick the one 
that was most different. They found that English speakers were more likely to exaggerate the 
subjective distances of colors close to the green-blue boundary. In other words, they tended to 
say that the overall difference between green and blue was greater than did Tarahumara speakers.  
In the past 20 years, there has been a resurgence of researchers examining Whorfian 
effects on color. A few are mentioned briefly here. Goldstein, Davidoff and Roberson (2009) 
found that English-speaking toddlers did better at recognizing and remembering colors that were 
between categories of blue and green than did Himba-speaking children, but only if the toddlers 
had blue and green in their vocabulary. It should be noted that Himba does not have green and 
blue color terms. This suggests that having specific color terms may aid in memorizing colors of 
objects. 
Winawer et al. (2007) discovered that Russian speakers were faster than English speakers 
at discriminating between light blue and blue (goluboy and siniy in Russian, respectively) in a 
reaction time task, but their advantage disappeared when they had to simultaneously do a verbal 
task. It should be noted that the Russian color terms for light blue and blue could both be 
considered basic color terms based on Berlin and Kay’s criteria, whereas light blue in English 
would not be considered a basic color term. Winawer et al. also discovered that Russian 
speakers’ advantage returned when doing a non-verbal spatial task. This indicates that language 
may aid in perceiving colors because when language resources in the brain were being used (i.e., 
when participants had verbal interference), Russian speakers were slower at discriminating 
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between light blue and blue hues. The effect reversed when language resources in the brain were 
not used.  
Kwok et al. (2011) recorded changes to the visual cortex as Mandarin-speaking 
participants were trained to distinguish between four made-up categories over three days. They 
observed that there was an increase of grey matter in the V2 and V3 areas of the left visual 
cortex, providing a possible structural basis in the brain for Whorfian effects. 
Russian and English Descriptions of Eyes 
Researchers studying cross cultural color perception have primarily used Munsell color 
chips as stimuli for participants. Munsell color chips represent a color space that defines color by 
three dimensions: hue, lightness and chroma. Because each color chip is a uniform color, they 
are useful in studying categories of color in general and have been used by most of the 
researchers mentioned in this introduction. Most researchers gave participants an array of color 
chips and had them organize them by color for example. Other researchers had participants 
indicate the best example of a color term (e.g., blue). However, I have not found any studies that 
looked at how people of different cultures perceive colors of real world objects. In contrast, I 
aimed to take the linguistic relativity hypothesis one step further. If it is valid, I would expect 
different cultures to think about the color of the same object differently if their languages use 
different color terms to describe that object. One just has to find an object that would meet such 
criteria. 
Fortunately, Russian and English describe eye color differently. Based on my own 
experience while living in Russia, I observed that what I describe as a blue eye, many Russians 
describe as a grey eye. This led me to believe that the two cultures label the same colored eye 
differently in at least some cases. There appears to be some evidence to back up my conclusion. 
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Examining how academics study eye color classification is one method of determining 
how different cultures describe eye color. In the West, in the early 20th century, Davenport and 
Davenport (1907) published an article in Science. In it, they stated that eye color falls into two 
categories: blue and brown. They also proposed that blue eyes were recessive to brown. Even 
today, many educators in English-speaking schools teach that people with blue eyes have 
recessive genes, even though such an explanation is overly simplistic and not entirely correct 
(Sturm & Frudakis, 2004). Many anthropological studies of eye color in the U.S. and Europe use 
a three-point scale consisting of combinations of blue, green-hazel and brown in order to classify 
eye-color (Sturm & Larsson, 2009). 
There are major differences in categorizing eye color in Russia. It should be noted that 
for much of the 20th century, Russia was under Soviet control and cut off from Europe and the 
West. Communication between the two blocs was limited. Soviet researchers often developed 
their own methods of doing research, and eye-color classification was no exception. V. V. Banak 
was a Russian anthropologist who studied, among other things, eye color. Banak developed a 
way to categorize eyes. In his system, there are three main types of eye-color: dark, mixed and 
light (Banak, 1965). Each main type is subdivided into categories. For brevity, I will only 
consider light colored eyes. Light colored eyes are divided into colors that would be translated 
into English as grey, light-blue, greyish light-blue and blue. Banak’s method is still popular in 
Russia today. For example, on one of Russia’s main social networking sites VK, there is a page 
dedicated to figuring out one’s eye color based on Banak’s scale (WotanJugend - INFO).  
Another way to look at differences between native Russian and English speakers in how 
they describe eye color is to look at dating sites aimed at Russian-speaking audiences and 
compare them to dating sites for English-speaking audiences. In my analysis of over 15 Russian 
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dating sites, seven had an option to specify one’s eye-color. See Table 1 for the eye-color options 
found on these Russian dating sites. There were five color options given on those sites: grey, 
light-blue, green, brown/hazel and black, which were translated from Russian color terms seriy, 
goluboy, zelyoniy, kariy and chyorniy, respectively (in Cyrillic: серый, голубой, зелёный, карий 
and чёрный).Of the seven sites, six contained the term grey. Of those six sites, four had grey as 
the first or second choice. More than ten English sites were also analyzed. Of those, seven gave 
users options to choose eye-color. See Table 2 for the eye color options on dating sites aimed at 
English speaking audiences. Of the seven sites, all of them had an option for blue, and five of 
them had an option for grey. Of those, blue was always in the first or second position, while grey 
never appeared higher than the third position.  
Table 1.  
Eye color options on Russian Dating Sites 
Russian Dating  
Website Eye Color 
  1st Option 2nd Option 3rd Option 4th Option 5th Option 6th Option 
mylove.ru Grey Light-Blue Green  Brown/Hazel Black Multicolored 
ru.fdating.com Black Grey Light-Blue Green Brown Brown/Hazel 
badoo.com Brown/Hazel Green Light-Blue Grey Hazel Black 
loveplanet.ru Brown/Hazel Grey Light-Blue Green N/A N/A 
rusdate.net Brown/Hazel Light-Blue Green  Black N/A N/A 
znakomstva.ru Light-Blue Green Grey Brown/Hazel Dark N/A 
komuza40.ru Brown/Hazel Grey Light-Blue Green  N/A  N/A 
 
Table 2 
Eye color options on English Dating Sites 
English Dating  
Websites Eye Color  
  1st Option 2nd Option 3rd Option 4th Option 5th Option 6th Option 
datehookup.com Blue Green Brown Hazel N/A N/A 
pof.com Blue Hazel Grey Green Brown N/A 
match.com Black Blue Brown Grey Green Hazel 
chemistry.com Black Blue Brown Green Grey Hazel 
spark.com* Blue Blue-Grey Blue Green Grey Green Grey Turquoise 
seniorsmeet.com Blue Green Hazel Brown Grey N/A 
christianmingle.com Black Blue Brown Green Hazel Red 
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Examining word frequencies can also shed light on how speakers of English and Russian 
describe eye color. I used the American Corpus (Davies, 2014) to compare two relevant phrases 
in English: Blue eyes and grey eyes (the term gray eyes was also included in the search). I 
searched the Russian National Corpus (2014) for three terms in Russian: grey eyes, light blue 
eyes, and blue eyes. Overall, in U.S. English, the term blue eyes occurred 3577 times and grey 
eyes occurred 666 times. In Russian, there were 1569 results for the term grey eyes, 1937 results 
for light blue eyes and 697 results for blue eyes. It should be noted that singular and plural forms 
of each term for each language were part of each search. Also, Russian is morphologically 
complex. The endings change by case (genitive, prepositional, etc.) depending on the noun or 
adjective’s role in the sentence. Word order in Russian is flexible as well. To compensate, all 
combinations of case and word order are included in the aforementioned results. 
There are two possible explanations for the above findings. One is that Russian and 
English speakers classify eye-color differently and may perceive and/or remember eye color 
differently. The other is that there are genetic differences between speakers of the two languages 
and ethnic Russians’ eyes are indeed greyer than native English speakers’. The truth may lie 
somewhere in between, and the present study helps answer such questions. 
Pilot Study 
Although the difference in describing eye color between the two cultures may have a 
genetic cause (e.g., ethnic Russians may have eyes that look greyer in general), it is unlikely that 
genetics is the only factor in determining how Russians describe eyes. In fact, a quasi-experiment 
would help determine whether language influences perception and memory. By providing native 
Russian and English speakers a picture of a blue or grey eye along with a color scale, any 
difference between the languages would indicate that language may play a role in perception. 
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One could also study whether language affects memory of eye color by showing participants the 
color scale separately after presenting a picture of an eye, or by having the participants label the 
color of an eye and match the color from memory. Having participants label the eye’s color 
would theoretically prime them to remember the eye as they described it, which would give 
strong evidence of language affecting memory. In a pilot study, I tested these possibilities. 
Ninety-seven participants (52 English speakers and 45 Russian speakers) rated the color 
of two eyes in one of three conditions: perception, memory, and label. In the perception 
condition, participants saw the color scale and eye simultaneously. Participants in the memory 
condition had to rate the color of the eye from memory, and the label condition was similar to the 
memory condition except those participants were asked to “describe the color of the eye” before 
rating the eye’s color.  
The results were mixed. Overall there was a main effect of language: Russian speakers 
rated the eyes as more grey (see Table 3). However, there was an unexpected interaction: both 
language groups were similar in their color rating for the label condition (see Figure 3). There 
are a couple of possible explanations for why this happened. The first is that the scale was 
flawed. The center of the scale was an estimated average of the eyes’ color. The luminance was 
increased by equal intervals on one side while the other side increased in blueness in the same 
manner. This may have confounded the results, exaggerating the effects between language 
groups. The scale was meant to start from grey and go to blue, but two variables (luminance and 
color) were manipulated instead of one. It is therefore hard to know what was determining a 
participant’s choice in any one condition, whether it be how light a color looks, or how blue it 
looks. A scale that systematically changes both dimensions at the same time to give shades of 
blue and grey may be a better choice.  
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Table 3 
Marginal Means and Other Descriptive Statistics of Pilot Study. Higher numbers indicate more 
blue, while lower numbers indicate more grey. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction graph of pilot study. Error bars represent standard errors.  
Condition Language n M SD Median Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Label English 17 4.59 1.88 4.5 1.5 8.0 0.25 -0.70 
Memory English 18 6.06 2.13 6.0 2.0 9.0 -0.22 -1.36 
Perception English 17 5.53 2.55 5.5 2.0 9.0 0.03 -1.68 
Label Russian 15 5.20 2.19 5.5 1.5 9.0 -0.16 -0.96 
Memory Russian 16 3.94 1.81 3.5 2.0 8.5 1.03 0.16 
Perception Russian 14 4.25 2.15 4.0 1.0 8.0 0.36 -1.05 
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A second problem with the pilot study applies only to the label condition. Participants 
were instructed to “describe the color of the eye.” Such instructions prompted both language 
groups to be as accurate as possible. In fact, both language groups described the eyes similarly. 
Terms like bluish-grey and light-bluish-grey were given. I searched the Russian National Corpus 
and American Corpus for such terms, and there were very few results (less than 30 for each 
language). It would seem that asking participants in the label condition what category the eye 
belonged to rather than having them describe the color may have yielded more language-specific 
results. 
The pilot study was informative. It provided novel evidence of the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis: there was an overall main effect of language. However, the color scale and 
instructions for the label group were flawed. These were corrected in the present study. 
Objectives and Hypotheses of This Thesis 
This study followed the same format as my pilot study, but it corrected its problems and 
included more stimuli to increase reliability and control for variables. I hypothesized that there 
would be an overall main effect of language on eye color ratings relating to how each language 
categorized eyes, which would provide evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Russian 
speakers were expected to rate the blue/grey eyes as being greyer on the color scale than would 
English speakers. I also expected Russian-speakers to be most different from English-speakers in 
the label and memory conditions and least different in the perception condition. I predicted this 
because color perception has a strong universal biological component, whereas color memory 
may rely more on how one categorizes objects. I did not believe there would be differences in the 
way Russian and English speakers rated colors of non-eye objects (e.g., tiles).The results of this 
ecologically valid study should help researchers better understand whether languages influence 
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how people perceive and remember the world. If the hypotheses are supported by the data, then it 
is plausible that language does influence memory and thought. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Fifty native Russian-speaking participants from St. Petersburg, Russia, and 50 native 
English-speaking participants living in central Florida participated in this experiment. All 
participants were screened by self-report prior to inclusion in the study for having normal color 
vision. 
Russian-speaking participants were recruited through snowball sampling of friends and 
family during May 2014. The mean age of the Russian speaking participants was 29.80 years 
(SD=10.35). 32 of these Russian speaking participants were women and 18 were men. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 60 years old.  
English-speaking participants were recruited either through snowball sampling or through 
the University of South Florida Student Psychology Participant Pool from May 2014–October 
2014. The mean age of the English speaking participants was 25.58 (SD=10.83). Ages ranged 
from 18 to 60 years old. 29 of the English speaking participants were women and 21 were men. 
Participants recruited through the USF participant pool were given one point of extra credit that 
they could apply to one of their psychology courses. 
Materials 
Stimuli. 32 pictures were presented to participants. 16 were pictures of various eyes. The 
eyes in each of the pictures were centered and zoomed in on. Of the 16 eye pictures, 10 were 
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blue (or grey) eyes, and six were brown eyes. The six brown eyes were included as foils to mask 
the intent of the study. See Figure 4 for an example of an eye picture used in the experiment. 
The remaining 16 pictures were of tiles. Each picture contained nine tiles, eight of which 
were white that surrounded a colored tile in the center. The color of each center tile was set to 
match the color of one of the eye images as follows: The color of the center tile was calculated 
by sampling 10 pixels from its corresponding eye and averaging them together. I chose each 
pixel at random using PicPick software. The 10 tiles associated with blue eyes were used as a 
control for how participants perceive and remember color. The six tiles associated with brown 
eyes served to mask the intent of the study. See Figure 4 for an example of a tile used in the 
experiment. 
  
Figure 4. An example of an eye used in the study on the left, and its corresponding tile 
used as a control on the right 
 
Response Scale. Participants were required to respond using a color scale comprised of a 
grid of color tiles. Two different response scale grids were presented to determine how 
participants perceived and remembered the color of the stimuli based on whether the eyes (and 
corresponding tiles) were blue/grey or brown. Each response scale consisted of 121 colors 
arranged in an 11x11 grid. 10 pixels from each picture were sampled from each eye and their 
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CIELAB values were determined. CIELAB is a color space that defines color based on three 
values: L, A and B. L refers to luminance, A corresponds with red and green (negative values 
indicate green, while positive values indicate red) and B corresponds to blue and yellow 
(negative values indicate blue while positive values indicate yellow) (Kuehni, 2003).  
Once each pixel’s color was defined in CIELAB color space for each picture, averages 
were computed. The average CIELAB color space values of the blue eyed pictures were then 
used as the center of the 11x11 color scale for the blue/grey eyes (and their corresponding tiles). 
The same procedure was done for the brown eyes, except samples of pixels from brown eyes 
were taken.  
CIELAB is an approximately uniform color space, meaning that uniform increases in the 
L, A or B components correspond to uniform changes in perceived color ("CIE 1976 L*a*b* 
colour space"). Thus, in order to make intervals on the blue scale relatively equal, the B or L 
components were increased or decreased from the center. Colors that were below the center of 
the blue eye color scale increased in the B component by a fixed amount, increasing blueness. 
Colors above the center decreased in the B component by fixed amount, making shades of grey. 
Colors to the right of the center increased in the L component, and colors to the left of the center 
decreased in the L component. The brown scale was created in a similar fashion, except both the 
A and B components changed along the vertical dimension to create shades of brown. See Figure 
5 for an example of both scales. 
Apparatus. A 15.6-inch Dell 1564 laptop with an LED screen was used to present 
stimuli and response scales. Participants recorded their responses using a mouse and the laptop’s 
keyboard. Stimuli and response scales were presented on OpenSesame software (Mathôt & 
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Theeuwes, 2012). The laptop was always plugged in to an outlet, and the same display settings 
were used for each participant. 
  
  
Figure 5. An example of the blue color scale (R) and brown color scale (L). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a perception condition 
(n=32), memory condition (n=34) and label condition (n=34). I tested each Russian participant 
individually in St. Petersburg, Russia in various locations. I tested each Russian speaker in 
Russian. English speakers were tested in a lab setting at the University of South Florida or in his 
or her home, and each was tested in English. Participants first read instructions on the computer 
in either Russian or English, depending on one’s native language. The stimuli and response 
scales were presented in a dark room after I was sure they understood the procedure. Stimuli 
were randomized and presented to participants in the same order each time. Participants were 
asked to match the color of part of a stimulus (e.g., the iris of the eye for the eye pictures or 
middle color of the tile pictures) to the picture’s corresponding color scale. The color scale was 
presented either with the stimulus or after it depending on condition. 
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In the perception condition, participants saw each picture and color scale simultaneously 
and were asked to indicate which color on the scale best represented the color of the eye or tile. 
Pictures of the eyes and tiles were presented on the left half of the screen and color scales were 
presented on the right. In order to pick a color, participants clicked on the color scale with the 
mouse. They had as much time as they wanted to respond.  
Participants in the memory condition looked first at the stimuli. Stimuli were presented in 
the middle of the screen. They had as much time as they needed to memorize the color of the 
stimuli. Participants then pressed the space bar with their left hand and a blank screen was 
presented for 2500 milliseconds. They then saw the response scale and were asked to indicate 
what color on it best represented the previous stimulus. In order to pick a color, participants 
clicked on the color on the color scale with the mouse. The response scale was also centered on 
the screen. They had as much time as they needed to respond. 
The label group followed the same procedure as the memory condition, except the blank 
screen that was presented between the stimulus and color scale was replaced with a screen with 
the phrase “Color Category?” centered in the middle that lasted 2500ms. Participants viewed the 
eye or tile and pressed the space bar. After the eye/tile picture disappeared, participants orally 
responded by saying what color category the eye or color in the middle tile belonged to. 
Participants were told to say whatever first came to mind. Oral responses were recorded, and 
participants then matched the color of the eye/tile to the scale from memory. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive Analyses 
Data were calculated by averaging each participant’s responses on the blue color scale for 
the 10 blue/grey eyes and their corresponding tiles. Because I was interested in the blue–grey 
dimension, only the vertical dimension of the blue color scale (see Figure 5) was used. Colors on 
the top row were coded 1, colors on the row immediately below it were coded 2, and so forth 
through 11. Therefore, if a participant matched an eye or tile to a color in the top row, the score 
for that item would be one. All in all, there were 20 data points for each participant (10 data 
points for the eyes and 10 for their corresponding tiles). 18 pairs of data points out of the 2000 
total data points were removed due to participant error (e.g., clicking or pressing the space bar 
too quickly resulting in not seeing a stimulus). Overall, internal reliability of the 10 individual 
responses for the blue eyes was good, α = 0.84. Having good internal reliability indicates that the 
mean of the ten items is a good measure of how participants were rating the eyes in general. 
Means, standard deviations and other descriptive statistics are given in Table 4 on page 30. 
Responses for how participants in the label condition categorized the eyes were recorded. 
Three responses from each language group were discarded due to participant error (e.g., clicking 
or pressing the space bar too quickly resulting in not seeing a stimulus). Responses were coded 
as blue, grey or other. All blue or grey responses contained only one color term (i.e., grey but not 
blue-grey), but they may have been paired with an adjective describing lightness (e.g., light-blue 
or dark-grey). For Russian participants goluboy and siniy were both coded as blue because they 
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both fall under the term blue in English. Responses coded as other either contained one color 
term unrelated to blue or grey (e.g., green) or a combination of color terms (e.g., bluish-green). 
89 percent of English-speaking responses were blue, 9 percent were grey and 1 percent were 
other. 50 percent of Russian responses were blue, 49 percent were grey and less than one percent 
were other. It should be noted that most Russian blue labels were the Russian word goluboy, 
meaning light blue. 
Demographic Analyses 
Demographic information on gender and age were collected from participants. To assess 
whether the proportion of males and females differed across languages, a 2 (language) x 2 
(gender) chi square analysis was used, and no significant difference was found, χ2(1, 
N=100)=0.38, p=.54. Two 3 (condition) x 2 (language) chi square analyses were also used to 
determine whether the proportion of males and females was different across each level of the 
independent variables. The number of males did not significantly differ across conditions, χ2(2, 
N=100) = 0.11, p=.94, and neither did the number of females, χ2(2, N=100) = 0.13, p=.94. A 3 
(condition) x 2 (language) ANOVA was used to analyze age differences across conditions. The 
main effect of language approached significance, F(1,94) =3.81, p=.05. English speakers 
(M=25.58, SD=10.83) were younger than Russian speakers (M=29.80 years, SD=10.35). 
However, the correlation between age and mean blue tile rating was not significant, r(98)=-0.10, 
p=.34. There was no main effect of condition, F(,94) =0.43, p=.65, and there was no interaction, 
F(2,94) =0.79, p=.50. 
Tests of Predictions 
In order to determine whether English speakers were more likely to describe an eye as 
blue than Russian speakers, the total number of blue responses was summed for each participant. 
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Table 4. 
Means and Other Descriptive Statistics for Eyes and Tiles.  
Higher means indicate more blue, while lower numbers indicate more grey. 
 
    
English Russian Total 
 Stimulus   
 
Condition n M SD Kurt n M SD Kurt n M SD Kurt 
Eye Perception 16 7.62 0.98 0.50 16 7.64 1.05 -1.53 32 7.62 1.00 -0.50 
 
Memory 17 7.13 1.28 -0.39 17 6.42 1.99 -0.42 34 6.78 1.69 0.43 
 
Label 17 6.95 1.38 -0.86 17 6.33 1.62 0.06 34 6.64 1.51 -0.20 
 
Total 50 7.23 1.24 0.04 50 6.78 1.68 0.19 100 7.00 1.49 0.64 
              
Tile Perception 16 6.06 0.75 0.30 16 6.05 0.83 -0.40 32 6.06 0.78 0.11 
 Memory 17 5.46 0.66 -0.97 17 5.68 0.90 -0.59 34 5.57 0.79 0.13 
 Label 17 5.22 1.08 0.58 17 5.9 1.11 -0.84 34 5.56 1.13 -0.25 
 Total 50 5.57 0.91 0.70 50 5.87 0.95 -0.39 100 5.72 0.94 0.19 
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Overall, Russian speakers used blue as a label less (M=5.00, SD=3.30) than did English speakers 
(M=8.71, SD= .91). An independent samples t-test where language group was the independent 
variable (equal variance was not assumed) was used to analyze these data, and a significant 
difference for how the language groups categorized eyes was found, t(18.92)=4.44, p<.001. 
In order to assess whether Russian and English speakers perceive or remember shades of 
grey or blue differently in general, a 3 (condition) x 2 (language) factorial ANOVA was used to 
analyze mean blueness ratings of the 10 tiles. There was no main effect of language, 
F(1,94)=2.65, p=0.11, nor was there an interaction, F(2,94)=1.25, p=0.29. There was a main 
effect of condition, F(2,94)=3.19, p=0.04. A Tukey HSD test was used to analyze this main 
effect. The largest mean difference was between the label and perception conditions. Participants 
in the perception condition rated the tiles as more blue (M=6.06, SD = 0.78) than did participants 
in the label condition (M=5.56, SD = 0.94), and the difference approached significance (p=.07). 
Refer to Figure 6 on page 35 for a graph of mean tile ratings.  
A 3 (condition) x 2 (language) ANCOVA with participants’ mean blue tile ratings of the 
participants as the covariate was used to analyze blueness ratings for the 10 blue/grey eye 
pictures. There were two reasons an ANCOVA was chosen. First, it increased power. It 
controlled for how participants perceived and remembered eye color by removing error variance 
for how they perceived and remembered color in general. Second, it more directly addressed the 
predictions than a 3 (condition) x 2 (language) x 2 (type of picture) repeated measures ANOVA. 
Overall, there was a main effect of language, F(1,93)=4.71, p=0.03, ƞp
2
=.05, d=.44. There was 
no main effect for condition, F(2,93)=2.47, p=0.09, ƞp
2
=.05, nor was there an interaction 
F(2,93)=2.38, p=0.28, ƞp
2
=.03. The ANCOVA can then be used to find adjusted cell means. 
Adjusted cell means are estimates of each group’s blue eye mean if all participants had the same 
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mean blue tile rating. The adjusted means are shown in Figure 8 on page 37(the means are 
evaluated at a mean blue tile rating of 5.72; they are estimates of what the mean of each 
condition would be if each participant rated the blue tiles as 5.72 on average). It should be noted 
that all the assumptions of ANCOVA were met. First, the covariate was correlated with the 
dependent variable (r=.34, p<.01). Second, the slopes did not significantly differ between 
conditions (see Figure 7 on page 36). This was tested by running a customized ANCOVA model 
examining all possible interactions between the covariate and dependent variables. No 
interactions differed between any combination of independent variables and the covariate (see 
Table 5 on page 36). Third, homogeneity of variance was not violated; a Levene’s test of 
equality of variances was not significant, F(5,94)=1.25, p=0.29.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 
The data were input into a Bayesian model that used Gibbs sampling based on work by 
Kruschke (2010). Bayesian analyses have several advantages over traditional analytic methods. 
First, they calculate the probability of the model based on the data and the model’s assumptions 
rather than the probability of obtaining data given the hypothesis. In other words, instead of 
testing the validity of the null hypothesis, they calculate how probable values of the parameter of 
interest are based on the data. Second, they are not dependent on how many statistical analyses 
are planned. In traditional null hypothesis significance testing, the family-wise error rate 
increases as the number of tests increase. This problem led to the development of post-hoc 
analyses (e.g., Tukey HSD). In Bayesian analyses, the inclusion of prior information and 
shrinkage of parameter estimates through the process of Gibbs sampling mitigates this problem. 
For example, the ANCOVA used to analyze the data obtained in this study yielded a significant 
main effect of language. It did not reveal a main effect of condition or interaction. It is not 
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recommended to do pariwise comparisons with null hypothesis significance testing when there 
are non-significant effects. This is not true of Bayesian analyses, in which one examines all data 
available because error rates are not inflated. 
The Bayesian model used was analogous to ANCOVA and the general linear model 
insofar as it looked at how predictor variables influenced a dependent variable while controlling 
for a covariate. It was hierarchical and examined how each independent variable and 
combination of independent variables changed the grand mean of the data. The model assumed 
that an individual score, nested within a condition or combination of conditions, came from a 
normal distribution and standard deviation. The mean blue score of the eye pictures (y) of any 
level of any combination of the independent variables was allowed to vary based on the 
following model: y =    +  ⃗  ⃗ +  ⃗  ⃗  +  ⃗    ⃗    +  ⃗  ⃗ , where  ⃗  and  ⃗  are the nominal 
predictors (language and condition respectively),  ⃗    is the interaction between those predictors 
and  ⃗  is the covariate (mean blue tile score).    is the grand mean, and  ⃗ ,  ⃗ ,  ⃗    and  ⃗  are 
deflections of the independent variables (i.e., estimates of how much an independent variable 
changes the grand mean   ).  
This Bayesian model required priors for each deflection (i.e., a prior belief as to how the 
deflections affect the grand mean). The priors on the deflections were based on normal 
distributions with a mean of zero. The standard deviations of those normal distributions were 
taken from gamma distributions where the shape and rate parameters were estimated based on a 
hierarchal prior (a gamma distribution with shape and rate parameters equal to one). In other 
words, the priors indicate a belief that there are no main or interaction effects. In order to 
estimate the values of the deflections, the model combines the probabilities provided by the 
priors and the probability of the actual data (i.e., the likelihood) to come up with a posterior 
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distribution for each level of each deflection. If most of the density (95%) of a posterior 
distribution (i.e., the highest density interval or HDI) of a deflection at any level of an 
independent variable does not include zero, then the deflection is deemed credible. It can be 
concluded that the corresponding independent variable had an effect on the dependent variable. It 
should be noted that, unlike null hypothesis significance testing, homogeneity of variance is not 
assumed (and didn’t need to be). Overall, the grand mean was estimated to be 7.02. There was a 
credible deflection of the perception condition of 0.41, and a credible deflection due to language 
of 0.27 for English and -0.27 for Russian (see Figure 9 on page 37).  
The above model was then used to estimate pairwise differences to see if the means of 
conditions are credibly different from each other. No adjustments needed to be made that would 
change power (i.e., Bonferroni corrections, Tukey HSD etc) because Bayesian analyses mitigate 
false alarms by incorporating prior beliefs. As a consequence there is shrinkage of parameter 
estimates (e.g., deflection estimates). In this model, it means the deflection estimates (and 
therefore mean differences) are closer to zero than they otherwise would have been had there 
been no priors (Kruschke, 2010). With this in mind, I was able to estimate the difference 
between means of the language groups (see Figure 10 on page 38), conditions (see Figure 11) 
and all combinations of language and condition (see Figure 12). A difference between means is 
significant if the 95% highest density interval does not include zero. According to the analysis, 
several means were credibly different. Russian-speakers rated the eyes 0.55 points greyer than 
English-speakers. Participants in the perception condition rated eyes 0.77 points bluer than the 
label condition. Russian-speakers in the label condition rated the eyes 0.94 points greyer than 
English-speakers in the memory condition, 1.16 points greyer than English speakers in the 
perception condition, and 1.14 points greyer than other Russian-speakers in the perception 
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condition. Finally, Russian speakers in the memory condition rated the eyes 0.97 and 0.95 points 
greyer than English and Russian speakers respectively in the perception condition. Within the 
label condition, there was almost a credible difference between Russian and English speakers 
(Russian-speakers rated the eyes 0.87 points greyer). There was virtually no difference between 
language groups in the perception condition 
. 
 
Figure 6. Means for blue tile ratings across conditions. Error bars represent standard 
errors 
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Table 5. 
Model testing the relationship between the covariate (mean blue tile score) and dependent 
variable (mean blue eye score) at each level of the independent variables. 
Source SS df MS F p 
Condition 1.74 2 .88 .46 .63 
Language 2.39 1 2.39 1.28 .26 
Mean Tile Score 19.25 1 19.25 10.29 <.01 
Condition x Mean Tile Score 1.14 2 .57 .31 .74 
Language x Mean Tile Score 1.19 1 1.19 .64 .43 
Condition x Language x Mean Tile 
Score 
3.23 2 1.62 .86 .43 
Error 168.41 90 1.87 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 7. Regression slopes of the dependent variable and covariate at all levels. 
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Figure 8. Adjusted mean estimates from the ANCOVA model. Error bars represent 
standard errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Estimates of deflections at each level of the independent variable. 
Condition 
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Figure 10. Mean difference of blue eye ratings between Russian and English speakers 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean differences of blue eye ratings between conditions 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean differences of blue eye ratings for all levels of language and condition.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Discussion 
 
The overall goal of the study was to examine in an ecologically valid way how language 
influences thought. This was done by taking an object (i.e., a blue eye) that is described 
differently in two languages and seeing how that description affected participants’ perception 
and memory. It was hypothesized that Russian-speaking participants would rate blue/grey eyes 
as being greyer than would English-speaking participants. If Russian speaking participants did 
so, then the linguistic relativity hypothesis would be supported. It was also hypothesized that the 
smallest difference between the English and Russian-speakers would be in the perception 
condition because color perception has such a strong universal biological component.  
The underlying assumption of the study was that English speakers are more likely to 
describe an eye as blue, whereas Russian speakers are more likely to describe the same eye as 
grey. The data suggest this is the case. Overall, Russian speakers were less likely to label the 
eyes as blue. Participants were viewing the same stimuli, yet eye labeling was different between 
the two languages.  
The results also suggest that there are no major differences in how Russian and English 
speakers perceive and remember shades of grey and blue when not associated with an eye. The 
fact that there was no main effect of language or an interaction between language and condition 
for mean blue tile ratings supports this conclusion. This also means that the results are not 
confounded by how the two language groups perceive and remember color in general. 
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Additionally, the fact that each tile’s color was based on an eye’s mean color suggests that colors 
found specifically in eyes don’t affect eye ratings.  
Interpreting how participants perceived and remembered eye color is more complicated. 
There are two approaches that are valid. The first is to analyze results from the ANCOVA, and 
the second is to analyze the Bayesian results.  
As hypothesized, Russian speakers generally rated the 10 eyes as greyer than did English 
speakers. Based on the ANCOVA, there was only a main effect of language. The effect size was 
moderate. There was no main effect of condition or interaction between condition and language. 
Because there was only a main effect of language, I could conclude that language does influence 
thought, both perceptually and through memory for specific objects (e.g., eyes). In other words, 
one may be tempted to conclude that languages that categorize objects using different colors 
actually see the colors of those objects differently. This is based on the fact that there was no 
main effect of language for the tiles but there was for the eyes. Such a conclusion would be 
interesting if true, but it seems precarious at best. For example, one could argue that the study 
was underpowered, and instead point to the fact that there was virtually no difference between 
Russian and English speakers in the perception condition in how blue or grey they rated the eyes. 
A study with more participants may yield a significant interaction. Because of this possibility, 
the Bayesian analysis was conducted. 
The Bayesian analysis offered more insight. In fact, it may be a more valid way of 
analyzing the data because it does not estimate the probability of the data given the hypothesis, 
but rather tests the hypothesis given the data. In addition, many of the assumptions needed in null 
hypothesis testing do not apply. Consequently, a more nuanced picture emerged by using the 
Bayesian analysis to calculate all possible pairwise differences. The results suggest there was 
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indeed a main effect of language. Russian speakers rated the blue/grey eyes as greyer than did 
English speakers. This finding supports the linguistic relativity hypothesis generally. The data 
also suggest that there was an interaction because there was no difference between Russian 
speakers and English speakers in the perception condition. This second finding supports 
universalism.  
A more in-depth examination of mean differences between conditions among each 
language group makes interpreting the results more complicated. As expected, Russian-speaking 
participants rated the eyes greyer in the label and memory conditions than in the perception 
condition. This finding suggests that the way language codes a stimulus (i.e., the color of an eye) 
affects how the stimulus is recalled. In contrast, there was no difference among English speakers 
in how they rated the eyes across conditions. The pattern observed among English speakers is 
intriguing, and there are several conclusions that can be made, some more valid than others. 
First, it may be evidence that language does not influence thought. Because Russian speakers in 
the memory and label conditions remembered eyes as greyer than did Russian speakers in the 
perception condition, one might expect the English speakers to rate the eyes as more blue in the 
memory and label conditions than in the perception condition. Because this was not the case, one 
may be tempted to conclude that the differences found among Russians happened by chance, and 
that language and thought are unrelated. However, the overall main effect of language supports 
the linguistic relativity hypothesis, making this first possibility unlikely. Second, it may indicate 
that it was incorrect to conclude from the Bayesian analysis that there was an interaction. 
Perhaps there is only a main effect of language, and similarities between the Russian and English 
participants in the perception condition happened by chance. Third, there could be a ceiling 
effect because the bluest colors on the color scale were not believable to participants as possible 
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eye colors, regardless of language. If there was such a ceiling effect, then English speakers were 
limited by the functionally truncated scale, and therefore couldn’t rate the eyes any bluer.  
What general conclusions can then be made from the data? The first is that Russian and 
English speakers differ in how they describe blue/grey eyes. English-speakers tend to use blue 
terms, whereas Russian speakers use both blue and grey terms. The second is that Russians tend 
to rate blue/grey eyes greyer than do English-speaking participants. This is supported by both the 
ANCOVA and Bayesian model. There is disagreement in the models as to whether there is an 
interaction. The ANCOVA suggests there is not, whereas the Bayesian analysis indicates that 
there may be one. If there is an interaction, then there is evidence for both universalism and the 
linguistic relativity hypothesis in terms of color perception and color memory. Thus, language 
may have more influence in how colors of objects are retrieved from memory than how they are 
actually perceived. This difference could be explained by the fact that language directs attention 
to certain characteristics about a stimulus (e.g., the grey or blue colors in an eye). Russians may 
focus more on the grey colors in an eye than English speakers do. This makes Russian-speakers 
more likely to remember grey colors from the eye. However, when participants from both 
language groups are given the opportunity to match a color to an eye at the same time as they 
perceive the eye, input from the cones in the retina is the deciding factor when participants make 
their choice. 
There are several limitations to this study. The first and foremost is that language is a 
grouping variable, not a true independent variable. Several uncontrolled factors could have 
influenced how the Russian participants remembered the eyes. For example it could be that 
Russians answer surveys differently than Americans because of cultural differences. However, 
language is a more parsimonious answer. In addition, the ANOVA testing how the independent 
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variables affect the tile ratings showed that Russian and American participants did not differ in 
their responses. If confounds affected how the language groups are reporting color, one would 
expect them to affect all stimuli equally. 
The second limitation is sample size. Originally, I had aimed for 200 total participants. I 
found as many Russian participants as was feasible given the resources and time available. 
Nevertheless, more participants would have increased power. Because more data increase 
confidence in one’s results, the fact that there were only 16-17 people in each condition per 
language group decreases certainty. Thus, it is possible that the main effect of language is 
spurious, or it is possible that the interaction would have been significant in the ANCOVA 
model. Further follow up studies are needed to see if the results are replicable. 
The third main limitation is the fact that the laptop used to show stimuli was not ideal. 
The LED display changes contrast depending on the angle viewed. However, I was careful to 
monitor participants and make sure the viewing angle was similar and they were seated the same 
distance away from the monitor. Moreover, the LED display is not a confound. All participants 
were tested in a dark room on the same computer using the same settings. Any complications 
resulting from the display would have affected all participants. It is a limitation because it may 
have increased error variance, resulting in less sensitivity, especially in finding a significant 
interaction. 
The last limitation is related to the tile stimuli. First, in retrospect, it would have been 
better to have sampled more pixels from each of the eyes in order to create a better average color 
for the tiles. This would also have increased the accuracy of each eye’s estimated average color, 
made the scale more accurately reflect the average color of the eyes and may have increased the 
correlation between the eyes and tiles. Second, the tile stimuli were solid colors, whereas the 
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irises were not. There are multiple colors in each eye. Further research is needed to assess how 
Russian and English-speakers process multi-colored stimuli. It could be that Russian and English 
speakers remember multi-colored stimuli differently. Thus, the main effect found would not have 
been due to language, but would have been due to differences in how the two cultures perceive 
and remember multi-colored objects. 
Conclusion 
The legitimacy of the linguistic relativity hypothesis has been debated in psychology for 
decades. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists have argued against it (Berlin & Kay, 1969; 
Pinker, 1995). They have contended that cognitive processes, such as color perception, are 
unaffected by one’s language. On the other hand, recent research suggests that color categories 
may affect color recognition (Goldstein, Davidoff & Roberson, 2009; Kwok et al., 2011; 
Winawer et al., 2007). The present study gives novel, ecologically valid evidence for the 
linguistic relativity hypothesis. The overall main effect of language, supported by both the 
ANCOVA and Bayesian analysis, suggests that language affects thought. A plausible 
explanation for why this happens is that language directs people to pay attention to certain 
characteristics of stimuli. Since Russian speakers are more likely than English speakers to 
describe eyes using grey terms, they may focus more on grey colors in eyes than English 
speakers do. This may make them more likely to remember eyes as being greyer than English 
speakers. Conversely, English speakers may focus on blue colors in eyes more than Russian 
speakers do. If language does direct attention, then it is not surprising that a main effect of 
language was found.  
The Bayesian analysis offers further insight. Those results support the ideas of 
universalism because there was virtually no difference in how Russian and English speakers 
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rated eyes in the perception condition. This is what one would expect given the strong biological 
component of color perception. It would also suggest that there is a limit to how much language 
can affect thought. Language most affected how the color of the eyes was remembered and not 
how they were perceived.  
In conclusion, this study suggests that there may be a compromise between universalism 
and the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Both ideas consider how thought and language interact. 
Universalism claims that cognition is independent of language. The linguistic relativity 
hypothesis states that thought and language are closely linked, and that the language one speaks 
influences how one thinks. Based on results from this study, the truth may lie somewhere in the 
middle. In terms of color, language influences memory the most and perception the least. Thus, 
blue may be in the eye of Russian speakers, but not their memory.  
46 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Berlin, B., & Kay, P. (1969). Basic color terms; their universality and evolution. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Boaz, F. (1911). Handbook of American Indian languages. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office. 
Bornstein, M. H., Kessen, W., & Weiskopf, S. (1976). Color vision and hue categorization in 
young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 2(1), 115-129. 
Bunak, V.V.(1965). Proiskhozhdeniye i Etnicheskaya Istoria Russkovo Naroda po 
Antropologicheskim Dannym [The origin and ethnic history of Russian people according 
to Anthropological Data]. Moscow, Russia: Nauka. 
CIE 1976 L*a*b* colour space. (n.d.). 17-157 CIE 1976 L*a*b* colour space. Retrieved March 
6, 2014, from http://eilv.cie.co.at/term/157 
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. 
Conklin H. (1955). Hanunoo color categories. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 11, 339-
344.  
Cornsweet, T. (2012). Visual perception. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Science.  
Davenport, G.C., & Davenport, C.B. (1907) Heredity of eye-color in man. Science, 26, 590–592. 
Davies, M. (2008-2014). The corpus of contemporary American English: 450 million words, 
1990-present. Available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/. 
Ebner, M. (2007). Color constancy. Chichester, England: John Wiley. 
47 
Goldstein, J., Davidoff, J., & Roberson, D. (2009). Knowing color terms enhances recognition: 
Further evidence from English and Himba. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
102(2), 219-238. 
Heider, E. R. (1971). 'Focal' color areas and the development of color names. Developmental 
Psychology, 4(3), 447-455. 
Heider, E. R. (1972). Universals in color naming and memory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 93(1), 10-20. 
Kay, P., & Kempton, W. (1984). What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis? American Anthropologist, 
86, 65-79.  
Kuehni, R. G. (2012). Color: an introduction to practice and principles (3rd ed.). Hoboken, N.J.: 
Wiley. 
Kuehni, R. G. (2003). Color space and its divisions : Color order from antiquity to the present. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience. 
Kwok, V., Niu, Z., Kay, P., Zhou, K., Mo, L., Jin, Z., & Tana, L. (2011). Learning new color 
names produces rapid increase in grey matter in the intact adult human cortex. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
108(16), 6686-6688.  
Leavitt, J. H. (2010). Linguistic relativities: language diversity and modern thought. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Mathôt, S., Schreij, D., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). OpenSesame: An open-source, graphical 
experiment builder for the social sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 44(2), 314-324. 
doi:10.3758/s13428-011-0168-7 
48 
Michaels, D. (1977). Linguistic relativity and colour terminology. Language & Speech, 20(4), 
333-343.  
Pinker, S. (1995). Language acquisition. In L.R. Gleitman & M. Liberman (Eds.), An invitation 
to cognitive science: Volume 1 (pp. 135-182). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
RNC. (2003-2014). Russian National Corpus. Available online at 
http://www.ruscorpora.ru/en/search-main.html 
Spillmann, L. (1990). Visual perception: the neurophysiological foundations. San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press. 
Stone, J. V. (2012). Vision and brain: How we perceive the world. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Sturm, R. A., & Frudakis, T. N. (2004). Eye colour: portals into pigmentation genes and 
ancestry. Trends in Genetics, 20(8), 327-332. 
Sturm, R. A., & Larsson, M. (2009). Genetics of human iris colour and patterns. Pigment Cell & 
Melanoma Research, 22(5), 544-562. doi:10.1111/j.1755-148X.2009.00606.x 
Whorf, B., & Carroll, J. B. (1998). Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of 
Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M., Wu, L., Wade, A., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). Russian blues 
reveal effects of language on color discrimination. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 104(19), 7780-7785.  
WotanJugend - INFO. (n.d.). VK. Retrieved March 6, 2014, from http://vk.com/wall-
39340950_36403 
  
49 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
IRB Approval Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
